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1. INTRODUCTION
Managing knowledge flows effectively is widely regarded as crucial for organisations that
wish to achieve competitive advantage (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Collins and Clark, 2003).
The existing human resources management (HRM) literature acknowledges in general terms
that this challenge can be best faced by adopting an HRM archetype characterised by the
presence of social networks (Lepak and Snell,  2007). Nonetheless,  this literature has not
given proper attention to the knowledge construct and, as a consequence, has neglected to
analyse empirically the relationship between intra-organisational knowledge sharing and site
productivity. This paper attempts to fill this research gap by explicitly focusing on HRM
practices that enhance social networks based on face-to-face communication (FTFC), as the
knowledge shared within these networks has strong bearings on competitive advantage.
FTFC arises when individuals physically close to each other engage in a mutual exchange
of  verbal information.  Like other communication mechanisms,  it  allows the exchange of
employees’ knowledge  throughout  the  organisation.  However,  exchanging  knowledge  by
means of FTFC is expected to be more effective compared to other means of information
sharing. Interactive networks based on the intranet or phone system, for example, are not
characterised  by  employees’ physical  proximity.  One-way  communication  practices  like
suggestion schemes,  formal surveys of employees and certain other types of information
disclosure  do not  entail  verbal  interaction  among individuals,  and  in  any case  result  by
definition in simple unidirectional knowledge flows (i.e., from the source of knowledge to its
recipient). Given their nature, the aforementioned communication mechanisms are expected
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to enhance the exchange of explicit knowledge, i.e. knowledge that can be easily codified,
throughout the organisation.
On the other hand, it is widely argued that FTFC is likely to result in the sharing of tacit
knowledge (Rebernik and Širec, 2007; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Koskinen et al., 2003;
Meherabian, 1971). As the latter is deeply embedded in its bearers, which are often unaware
of possessing it (Polanyi, 1966), physical contact and verbal interaction are crucial requisites
for its  transfer among individuals.  Tacit  knowledge is highly idiosyncratic and thus very
difficult  to  imitate  (Nonaka,  1991;  Grant,  1993;  Spender,  1993;  Sobol  and  Lei,  1994;
Ambrosini and Bowman, 2001), which makes it a unique source of competitive advantage.
While it is arguable that all social networks based on FTFC actually result in the sharing of
tacit  knowledge,  the  personalisation  and  multi-directionality  of  knowledge  flows
characterising  these  networks  suggest  that  this  communication  mechanism  is  to  be
considered as qualitatively superior compared to other means of knowledge exchange.
The above remarks suggest that workplaces that implement HRM practices in such a way
as to facilitate FTFC among employees are expected to show a better economic performance
compared to workplaces where such arrangements are absent.  The main objective of this
paper is indeed to investigate whether this expectation is supported by empirical evidence.
To this end we use cross-sectional data on around 500 British trading workplaces for which
information on HRM practices enhancing FTFC (namely, problem-solving groups, teams,
meetings between senior  managers and employees,  meetings between line managers  and
employees, and committees of managers and employees’ representatives) and account-based
measures of labour productivity is available. Information on HRM practices comes from the
Management Questionnaire of the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS),
while the measures of value added per employee are drawn from the linked WERS 2004
Financial Performance Questionnaire and Annual Business Inquiry, made available by the
Office for National Statistics in London. 
This paper contributes to the existing research on the association between HRM practices
and labour productivity in several ways. First, it seeks to give serious attention to the concept
of knowledge, which has been up-to-now rather neglected by HRM studies and remained in
the  exclusive  domain  of  the  knowledge  management  literature.  Second,  by  assessing
workplaces’ productivity gains deriving from knowledge sharing through FTFC it makes a
first attempt to draw a distinction between the different communication mechanisms used by
organisations to manage their internal knowledge. Finally, this paper is one of the few studies
to use objective measures of labour productivity for British workplaces. With few exceptions
(namely, Patterson et al. (1997) and Guest et al. (2003)), in fact, the existing HRM studies
have relied on subjective measures of labour productivity (e.g.  Bryson  et al., 2005; Guest
and Hoque, 1994; Hoque, 1999; Wood and de Menezes, 1998).
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the importance of
FTFC  for  intra-organisational  knowledge  sharing,  exposes  the  relevant  literature  on  the
association between HRM practices and workplace productivity, and provides a rationale for
the conceptualisation of knowledge sharing within this literature. Section 3 describes the data
employed. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 - Knowledge sharing through FTFC
The  resource-based  view  of  the  firm  (Barney,  1991)  suggests  that  an  organisation  can
achieve market dominance by combining resources that are rare, valuable and difficult to
imitate. Among the many possible resources that an organisation can use for this purpose,
knowledge stocks (that is,  the knowledge embedded in its workers) is an often cited one
(Jackson  et al.,  2003). Nonetheless,  it  has been pointed out that while knowledge stocks
provide organisations with the foundation for competitive advantage, what really matters is
the effective management of knowledge flows (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Collins and Clark,
2003). This is achievable by workplaces through the establishment of social networks made
up  of  individuals  with  strong  ties  and  reciprocal  trust  (Lepak  and  Snell,  2007).  The
increasing interest in knowledge sharing through social networks has shifted the research
focus from human capital to social capital, the latter being defined as “the sum of the actual
and potential  resources  embedded within,  available  in,  and derived from the network of
relationships possessed by an individual or social unit (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998: 243).”
This  idea  is  already  present  in  Tsoukas  (1996),  who  views  the  firm  as  a  ‘distributed
knowledge system,’ where knowledge is embedded in individuals,  located in its different
parts, and their social interactions.
It is important to note that the knowledge that can be shared within social networks can
be explicit or tacit in its nature. Explicit knowledge is that type of knowledge that can be
codified and thus communicated easily (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Interactive networks
based on the intranet or phone systems are an example of intra-organisational arrangements
enhancing  the  transfer  of  explicit  knowledge.  One-way  communication  practices  like
suggestion  schemes,  formal  surveys  of  employees  and  information  disclosure  from
employees to managers or from managers to employees are also important means to diffuse
explicit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is instead very difficult to formalise and therefore to
transfer,  since it  is  deeply  embedded in  its  bearers  (Nonaka,  1991).  The latter  are  often
unaware  of  possessing  it.  As  pointed  out  by  Michael  Polanyi,  who  first  introduced  the
concept of tacit knowledge, “we can know more than we can tell (Polanyi, 1966: 4).” Tacit
knowledge is being increasingly regarded as  the recipe for competitive advantage (Grant,
1993; Spender, 1993; Sobol and Lei, 1994). Given its high level of personalisation, in fact,
tacit knowledge can be considered unique, imperfectly mobile/imitable and non-substitutable
(Ambrosini and Bowman, 2001) and thus closer than explicit knowledge to the definition of
‘resource’ required by the resource-based view of the firm.
According to Nonaka (1991) and Sternberg (1994), tacit knowledge is practical (i.e., it
describes a process) and context-specific (i.e., it is acquired in situations where it is used).
Therefore, it can be better acquired through personal experience and learning by doing in
practical situations entailing face-to-face interactions such as coaching, networking and the
like (Rebernik and Širec, 2007). According to Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), personal contact
enhances the tacit-to-tacit  knowledge exchange. Koskinen  et al.  (2003) view face-to-face
interaction as the richest medium to transfer knowledge, as “it allows immediate feedback so
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that understanding can be checked and interpretation corrected (Koskinen et al., 2003: 286).”
This  form of  interaction  is  in  fact  less  likely  to  result  in  misinterpretation  of  meanings
compared  to  other  forms  of  social  relations,  since  the  knowledge  conveyed  by  body
language, facial expression and tone of voice goes beyond the spoken message (Meherabian,
1971). 
In conclusion, a large knowledge management literature supports the view that that social
networks  based  on  employees’ physical  contact  and  dialogue  are  likely  to  result  in  the
diffusion of tacit knowledge throughout the organisation. Therefore, we would expect that,
other things being equal, workplaces facilitating FTFC among employees enjoy a substantial
competitive advantage, in the form of higher productivity, compared to workplaces where
this means of knowledge sharing is absent. This proposition is certainly very appealing from
a theoretical point of view, but requires some empirical testing.
2.2 - Empirical evidence on the nexus HRM practices-labour productivity
A body of  industry-specific  and cross-industry  empirical  studies  published by American
researchers suggests a positive association exists between specific HRM practices, labelled
‘high-performance’ HRM practices, and organisational productivity in the US (Appelbaum
et  al.,  2000;  Arthur,  1994;  Batt,  1999;  Cappelli  and  Newmark,  2001;  Huselid,  1995;
Ichniowski  et al.,  1997; MacDuffie,  1995).  These studies measure labour productivity as
either the number of working hours required to produce a specific output (e.g. a ton of steel
at a mini-mill or a vehicle at an assembly plant) or the value of sales per employee. The
practices  in  question  are  those  that  allow  organisations  to  elicit  their  employees’
discretionary effort through the exploitation of the three conditions advocated by the AMO
paradigm (Appelbaum et al., 2000): workers’ ability (A) is ensured through the selection or
initial training of employees with high skills or formal education and allows the deployment
of a large stock of human capital; workers’ motivation (M) is achieved through the provision
of  incentives  such  as  investments  in  further  training,  employment  security  and  trust-
enhancing systems of performance management (e.g. performance-related pay and internal
promotions); working arrangements like self-managed teams and off-line problem-solving
groups  can  provide  workers  with  the  opportunity  (O)  to  influence  the  decision-making
process of the organisation and allow them to share their task-specific knowledge.
As  yet,  few  company-level  studies  on  the  association  between  HRM  practices  and
workplace productivity are available for Britain.  Furthermore, most of these studies base
their assessment on subjective measures of labour productivity. For example, using data from
the WERS 1998, which includes 2,191 establishments from different sectors with 10 or more
employees,  Bryson  et al. (2005) find a positive impact of bundles of 9 HRM practices on
subjective  measures  of  labour  productivity  for  unionised  workplaces.1 Guest  and  Hoque
(1994) use a dataset of 122 non-unionised workplaces with 50 or more employees to explore
the  association  between counts  of  21 HRM practices  and subjective  measures  of  labour
1 The  self-assessed  measures  of  labour  productivity  reported  in  the  Cross-Section  Management
Questionnaire of the WERS indicate whether managers perceive their establishment’s labour productivity as
much higher, higher, the same, lower or much lower than the average labour productivity of their industry.
5
productivity (compared to the best UK performers in the sector). They find that workplaces
adopting a number of practices higher then the median enjoy higher productivity. Using a
sample  of  209  hotels  with  25  or  more  employees,  Hoque  (1999)  also  finds  a  positive
association between the number of practices in place (among 21) and subjective measures of
labour productivity.  Wood and de Menezes (1998) use a nationally representative sample of
899 workplaces in the private sector with 25 or more employees. The authors use a latent
class analysis of seven practices to retrieve four categories of ‘high commitment’ practices
(based on the extent of the adoption) and find that only workplaces in the third category, i.e.
medium/high adoption, enjoy higher self-reported labour productivity. 
Only few studies have explored the HRM-performance nexus in UK organisations relying
on objective measures of productivity. Patterson et al. (1997) analyse the change in sales per
employee for 67 single-site UK companies with 60 or more employees in the manufacturing
sector using factor scores of HRM practices and find a positive association. Guest  et al.
(2003) use cross-section and panel data for 366 UK manufacturing and service companies
with more than 50 employees.  They find a positive relationship between an index of 48
HRM practices and subjective measures of labour productivity. However, this relationship
disappears when objective productivity measures (sales per employee) are employed. 
The extent to which subjective and objective measures of labour productivity converge is
still an issue subject to debate (Forth and McNabb, 2008; Machin and Stewart, 1996; Wall et
al.,  2004).  Nonetheless,  the  lack of  availability  of  objective  measures  of  productivity  is
generally  regarded  as  a  weak  point  of  the  UK-based  empirical  research  on  the  HRM-
productivity nexus.
2.3 - HRM practices and knowledge sharing
As  explained  above,  the  concept  of  knowledge  is  central  to  the  AMO  paradigm.
Importantly, ‘eliciting discretionary efforts from employees,’ an expression often used by the
advocates  of  the  latter  in  reference to  high-performance HRM practices,  can broadly be
considered as equivalent to ‘eliciting employees’ knowledge.’2 However, this point has been
rather neglected by the theoretical HRM literature, with the consequence that the same HRM
practices, rather than employees’ knowledge, are generally viewed as the resources to be
combined to achieve competitive advantage. From an empirical point of view, this lack of
attention  to  the  knowledge  construct  has  been  exacerbated  by  the  widespread  use  of
aggregate HRM indexes, which do not permit to disentangle the performance contribution of
HRM  practices  enhancing  employees’  knowledge  disclosure  from  that  of  other
organisational arrangements or processes. 
In  order  to  study  the  per  se contribution  of  employees’  knowledge  to  workplace
productivity it is then crucial to clearly identify those HRM practices that bear implications
for knowledge disclosure and keep them conceptually separated from other HRM practices.
An  attempt  in  this  sense  has  been  made  by  some  studies  on  intra-organisational
communication  and  information  sharing.  Bryson  et  al.  (2006),  for  example,  explore  the
2 Obviously,  in  some instances,  the  effort  elicited  from employees  does  not  refer  to  their  knowledge.
Motivating the workforce, for example, may lead them to work longer hours rather than disclose information.
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association between subjective measures of workplace productivity and ‘voice practices,’
where  the  latter  category  includes  “any  formal  mechanism  by  which  workers  can
communicate their views to managements (Bryson et al., 2006: 439).”3 However, from the
viewpoint  of  this  paper,  a general  concern about  their  study is  that  HRM practices with
opportunities for two-way communication like meetings of managers and employees and
problem-solving groups of non-managerial  employees are considered as having the same
importance  as  one-way  communication  practices  like  formal  surveys  of  employees’
views/opinions and suggestion schemes. Furthermore, a two-way communication practice
like teams is not included in the ‘voice’ category. Pertinently, Peccei et al. (2005) highlight
that existing studies “do not, by and large, make a clear distinction … between the various
communication  mechanisms that  are  used in  organisations  and the  actual  content  of  the
information that is disclosed to employees (Peccei  et al., 2005: 13).” Peccei  et al. (2005)
address this concern by studying the association between subjective measures of productivity
and downward communication, that is, information disclosure from managers to employees
of information relating to internal investment plans, staffing plans and the financial position
of  the  workplace.  While  the  authors  consider  a  well-defined  channel  of  information
disclosure, the latter simply entails unidirectional knowledge flows. As previously argued,
these flows are not those with the highest potential for competitive advantage.
In this paper we explicitly focus on FTFC as the  means through which knowledge is
shared among employees. It is important to clarify that the term ‘knowledge sharing’ is used
throughout the paper to indicate a process of knowledge exchange where each individual
involved is at the same time knowledge sender and receiver. Knowledge sharing is therefore
conceptually different from knowledge transfer.
We consider  five  HRM practices  that  potentially imply  FTFC.  Specifically,  we view
problem-solving groups of non-managerial employees and teams of core employees as HRM
practices  enhancing  workplace  communities  within  which  workers  can  share  their  tacit
knowledge. Meetings of senior managers and employees and joint committees of managers
and employees’ representatives are also considered, with the acknowledgement that in this
case  the  assumption  that  FTFC results  in  tacit  knowledge sharing may be  less  realistic,
considered the limited time spent by individuals within these networks compared to problem-
solving groups and teams, and given the low level of personalisation of human interactions
characterising  them.  Finally,  we  include  meetings  of  line  managers  and  employees.
According to the WERS 2004, the survey on which this paper draws the data, line managers
(or foremen) are non-managerial employees that have duties involving the supervision of
other employees. The possibility that tacit knowledge is shared within this network is higher
compared to meetings of senior managers and employees,  since the working relationship
established among peer workers is more likely to be characterised by a higher degree of
personalisation. However, what is important to stress here is that, regardless of what type of
knowledge is actually disclosed within the five networks considered, when such networks
entail physical proximity and verbal interaction among employees they will provide a better
context for knowledge to be shared.
Throughout the paper, we attempt to distinguish between the actual presence of FTFC
3  On ‘voice practices’ see also Kersley et al. (2006) and Marchington (2007).
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within the five networks (in which case we speak of effective FTFC practices) and instances
where individuals within such networks do not engage in FTFC (in which case we refer to
these as merely formal FTFC practices).4 When we refer to the five HRM practices without
specifying whether FTFC is actually present (the general approach adopted by the existing
HRM literature) we shall call them potential FTFC practices. 
Finally, this paper  considers the time length for which FTFC practices are in place and
their frequency. It is argued, in fact, that for the transfer of tacit knowledge to take place a
high number of knowledge exchanges among individuals is required (Szulanski, 1996).
3. DATA DESCRIPTION
3.1 - Productivity measures
The dependent variable in our regression analysis is value added (in thousands of pounds)
per employee. This measure of labour productivity is drawn from a dataset, provided by the
Micro-data  Analysis  User  Support  team at  the  Office  for  National  Statistics  in  London,
which results from the merging of the WERS 2004 Financial Performance Questionnaire and
the Annual Business Inquiry. After the exclusion of outliers, value added per employee is
available  for  570  of  the  trading  workplaces  included  in  the  WERS 2004  Cross-Section
Survey of Managers (see Forth and McNabb, 2007). It is important to note that while the
inclusion of account-based measures of labour productivity strongly reduces the size of the
sample of trading workplaces, it nevertheless permits to overcome the historical criticism
attracted by the subjective assessment by managers of their workplace’s labour productivity
relative to other establishments in the same industry.5
3.2 - HRM practices capturing knowledge sharing through FTFC
Our independent  variables  are selected HRM practices  potentially  enhancing FTFC. The
source of data on these is the WERS 2004 Cross-Section Survey of Managers, a nationally
representative survey which includes detailed information, provided by managers responsible
for employment relations matters, on a large number of HRM practices for 2,295 private and
public UK workplaces with 5 or more employees. We limit our study to workplaces in the
trading sector because data on objective measures of labour productivity are available only
4 The need to identify  effective FTFC communities,  as opposed to  merely formal ones, arises from the
awareness that some HRM practices represent a missed opportunity to enhance knowledge sharing among
individuals.  For  example,  the  members  of  a  team  may  not  exchange  their  knowledge  in  organisations
dominated by the activity of the so-called ‘knowledge workers,’ who tend to develop their networks with
external  institutions  rather  than  with  co-workers  within  the  firm  (Swart,  2007).  In  this  case  the  team
arrangement (a potential FTFC community) gives raise to a merely formal FTFC community, which limits
productivity gains for the organisation. 
5 Forth and McNabb (2008) analyse the extent to which subjective measures of productivity reported in the
WERS 2004 and objective measures obtained after linking the Financial Performance Questionnaire with the
Annual Business Inquiry converge.
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for a subset of trading workplaces, due to the interest in studying organisations with a profit-
maximising behaviour. Our analysis focuses on the following HRM practices:
 Teams. The Survey of Managers reports the proportion (0, 1-19, 20-39, 40-59, 60-
79,  80-99 or  100 per  cent)  of  core  employees  working in  formally-designated
teams at each workplace.6
 Problem-solving (PS) groups. These are groups of non-managerial employees that
solve specific problems or discuss aspects of performance or quality. Managers
provided the proportion (coded as for teams) of workplace employees involved in
such groups over the past year. 
 Briefings. These are meetings between line managers and employees.
 Meetings. These are meetings between senior managers and employees.
 Committees.  These are joint committees made up of managers and employees’
representatives, and are mainly concerned with consultation. 
Table 1 shows the percentage of trading workplaces adopting each of these arrangements as
either potential or effective FTFC practices. These percentages are obtained based on the
sub-sample of trading workplaces for which objective measures of labour productivity are
available, and for which all the variables in question are non-missing. Nonetheless, figures
are  weighted  in  order  to  be  made  representative  of  the  whole  population  of  trading
workplaces (see Forth and McNabb, 2007). We consider teams and PS groups as adopted if
they involve any percentage of employees at the workplace or, alternatively, if they involve
at least 60 per cent of employees. 
Effective FTFC practices are those practices identifying  employees’ networks actually
relying  on  FTFC.  We  try  to  capture  the  presence  of  FTFC  using  specific  pieces  of
information provided in the WERS 2004 Cross-Section Survey of Managers. Specifically,
teams are defined as effective FTFC practices if their members jointly decide how the work
is to be done. Meetings and briefings entail FTFC if at least 25% of the time is available to
employees to ask questions or offer their view. By their nature, PS groups and committees
are arrangements aimed at enhancing FTFC among individuals and therefore they already
identify effective FTFC practices. This explains why, in the table, these two arrangements
show exactly the same percentages for potential and effective practices. We can see that the
percentage of workplaces adopting effective FTFC practices is largely (always more than one
third) lower than the percentage of workplaces adopting potential FTFC practices.
Table 2 reports the average value of our productivity measure across the five practices in
question, again distinguishing between potential and effective FTFC practices. Additionally,
6 Core employees are employees belonging to the largest non-managerial occupational group among those
listed in the Standard of Occupational Classification (SOC) 2000.
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Teams (any percentage of core employees)
Teams (at least 60% of core employees)
PS groups (any percentage of non-managerial employees)
PS groups (at least 60% of non-managerial employees)
Meetings
Briefings
Committees
Potential Effective
Mean (s.e.)
29% (3.6%)
40% (3.9%)
14% (2.4%)
56%(4.0%)
45% (3.9%)
14% (2.4%)
  6% (1.9%)
71% (3.6%)
56% (4.0%)
10% (1.9%)
35% (3.7%)
TABLE 1
Descriptive statistics for the adoption of FTFC practies
Notes : Figures are weighted to make them representative of the population of trading workplaces with 5 or
more employees. They are based on 545 observations. Standard errors (s.e.) in parentheses.
32% (3.6%)
Mean (s.e.)
FTFC practices FTFC practices
  6% (1.9%)
10% (1.9%)
mean values for workplaces which do not adopt these practices at all are reported. We notice
that,  with  the exception of  committees,  value-added per  employees  is  always higher  for
workplaces adopting any of the five arrangements (second column) compared to the case of
non-adoption  (first  column).  Considering  the  practices  in  the  presence  of  FTFC  (third
column), we can see that workplaces adopting meetings and briefing with FTFC outperform
workplaces  adopting  the  same  practices  regardless  of  whether  FTFC is  present.  On  the
contrary, labour productivity is lower in the case of teams with FTFC compared to teams
adopted as a potential FTFC practice. However, this result may be driven by the existence of
FTFC-related benefits that depend on the relative size of the networks (i.e. percentage of
employees involved). The paper will also explores this issue.
     
Teams (any percentage of core employees) 4.609 (0.033) 4.629 (0.033) 4.625 (0.047)
Teams (at least 60 % of core employees) 4.602 (0.028) 4.643 (0.039) 4.630 (0.055)
PS) groups (any percentage of non-managerial employees) 4.623 (0.026) 4.608 (0.037) 4.608 (0.037)
PS groups (at least 60 % of non-managerial employees) 4.619 (0.025) 4.651 (0.056) 4.651 (0.056)
Meetings 4.581 (0.038) 4.636 (0.029) 4.646 (0.037)
Briefings 4.545 (0.026) 4.674 (0.033) 4.680 (0.047)
Committees 4.615 (0.024) 4.591 (0.047) 4.591 (0.047)
Value-added per employee is expressed in logarithms. Standard errors (s.e.) in parentheses.
TABLE 2
Comparison of value-added per employee across FTFC practices
Notes : Figures are weighted to make them representative of the population of trading workplaces with 5 or more employees.
FTFC practices
Potential FTFC practices
No adoption Adoption
Effective
Mean (s.e.)Mean (s.e.) Mean (s.e.)
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3.3 - Workplace, organisation and market controls
In our regressions we also control for the workplace characteristics of size (logarithm of the
number of employees), age (dummy for workplaces more than 20 years old) and trade union
recognition  (dummy  variable).  The  organisation  characteristics  of  size  (dummy  for
organisations  with  more  than  1000  employees)  and  foreign  ownership  (dummy  for
workplaces belonging to an organisation which is at least 50 per cent foreign-owned) are also
included. Finally, we control for the degree of competition in the market (represented by the
management informant’s assessment on a 1-to-5 scale, where 1 is very low and 5 very high)
and the industrial sector (11 dummies at the SIC 2003 section level). 
3.4 - Other HRM controls
Finally, we control for the presence of the following HRM practices, that we group in two
categories:
1)HRM practices enhancing the deployment and development of a skilled workforce:7 
 Skilled  workforce (1  if  50  per  cent  or  more  of  employees  are  professionals,
associate professionals or technical employees and 0 otherwise).
 Off-the-job training (1 if at least 60 per cent of experienced core employees have
been given time off their work in the last year to receive training and 0 otherwise).
 Induction programme (1 if an induction programme for new core employees exists
and 0 otherwise).
 Recruitment test (1 if  a personality or performance test  is used for recruitment
purposes and 0 otherwise).
 Performance appraisal (1 if it applies to at least 60 per cent of non-managerial
employees and 0 otherwise). 
 Multiskilling (1 if at least 60 per cent of core employees are formally trained to do
jobs other than their own and 0 otherwise).
7 A schooling  variable  and  a  skill  indicator  for  core  employees  have  been  built  with  the  purpose  of
controlling  for  human  capital  differences  among  workplaces.  The  “schooling  attainment”  variable  was
obtained by giving a score to each employee based on the highest academic qualifications reported in the
Survey of Employees Questionnaire of the WERS 2004. After ranking the maximum academic attainments on
a 6-point scale, we calculated the median for core employees in each workplace. The skills variable was
obtained in a similar way based on the number of years that employees spent at the workplace, which the SEQ
ranks from 1 to 5. However, these two indicators have not been used alongside with the additional HRM
controls since their inclusion reduced the number of observations to only around 370 workplaces.
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According  to  the  AMO paradigm,  the  above HRM practices  reflect  the  level  of  human
capital (i.e.,  employees’ ability) available to the organisation. Therefore, they allow us to
control  for  differences  among  workplaces  in  the  endowment  of  knowledge  that  can
potentially be shared among employees through FTFC-based networks. 
2) HRM practices providing employees with trust and motivation:
 Employment security (100 minus the percentage of employees, among those in the
payroll  during  the  past  year,  who stopped  working  at  the  workplaces  because
dismissed).
 Internal recruitment (1 if, when filling vacancies, internal applicants are the only
sources  or,  other  things  equal,  they  are  preferred  to  external  applicants  and  0
otherwise). 
 Performance-related pay (1 if  employees are paid based on result/merit  pay or
receive profit-related payments or bonuses and 0 otherwise).
 Core  employees’ autonomy (scale  composed  of  three  items:  discretion,  control
over the pace and involvement in decisions over their work; Cronbach’s alpha is
0.72).
 Information disclosure (scale composed of three items: disclosure by managers to
employees of information relative to internal investment plans, financial position
of the workplace and financial position of the organisation; Cronbach’s alpha is
0.71).
Motivating workers through organisational commitment in order for them to share their
knowledge is in fact considered a key issue for the successful management of knowledge
(Hislop, 2003).
Taking account of non-missing observations on the HRM practices reflecting FTFC,
the productivity measures, the workplace, organisation and market characteristics, and the
other HRM controls we end up with a dataset including a number of workplaces slightly
higher than 500. The actual size varies according to what variables we are considering in
any specific regression.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Our empirical analysis first assesses whether the adoption by workplaces of teams, problem-
solving groups, meetings between line/senior managers and employees and joint consultative
committees, i.e. HRM practices identifying potential FTFC communities is positively related
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to  labour productivity.  Subsequently,  we explore whether  there is  a  positive productivity
differential between effective and merely formal FTFC communities. A finding in this sense
would suggest that it is FTFC that matters for productivity enhancements rather than HRM
practices  per  se,  and  that  previous  studies  may  have  failed  to  capture  the  important
contribution that  knowledge shared through this means bears  for  workplace productivity.
Finally,  we investigate  whether  the  association  between  FTFC and productivity  changes
               
Regression 1.1 Regression 1.2
Variables Coeff. (std. err.) Coeff. (std. err.)
PS groups (1-19%) -0.062 (0.070) -0.082 (0.071)
PS groups (20-39%) -0.117 (0.058)** -0.118 (0.056)**
PS groups (40-59%) -0.022 (0.073) -0.008 (0.074)
PS groups (60-79%)  0.155 (0.143)  0.154 (0.131)
PS groups (80-99%)  0.028 (0.099)  0.036 (0.095)
PS groups (100%) -0.108 (0.073) -0.096 (0.077)
Teams (1-19%)  0.032 (0.069 -0.015 (0.073)
Teams (20-39%) -0.008 (0.062)  0.058 (0.105)
Teams (40-59%) -0.033 (0.114) -0.200 (0.090)**
Teams (60-79%)  0.004 (0.057) -0.031 (0.129)
Teams (80-99%) -0.028 (0.045)  0.022 (0.056)
Teams (100%)  0.050 (0.043) -0.002 (0.061)
Teams (1-19%) with FTFC  0.122 (0.142)
Teams (20-39%) with FTFC -0.119 (0.112)
Teams (40-59%) with FTFC  0.454 (0.194)**
Teams (60-79%) with FTFC  0.020 (0.134)
Teams (80-99%) with FTFC -0.076 (0.070)
Teams (100%) with FTFC  0.060 (0.077)
Meetings -0.046 (0.036) -0.059 (0.045)
Meetings with FTFC  0.023 (0.043)
Briefings  0.040 (0.032)  0.010 (0.045)
Briefings with FTFC  0.021 (0.048)
Committees  0.038 (0.046)  0.031 (0.040)
R-squared  0.449  0.450
Number of observations 523 514
 
Notes : Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted to account for the complex survey
design in the 2004 W ERS. All the variables l isted in Section 3 are controlled for.
**: significant at the 5% level.
TABLE 3
The association between FTFC practices and labour productivity
according to the intensity of adoption of FTFC.
Table 3 presents the results of the productivity regressions obtained when FTFC practices
are considered as implemented regardless of the length of time for which they are actually in
place.  In  Regression  1.1  we  report  the  coefficients  and  standard  errors  for  the  dummy
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variables capturing  potential  FTFC practices. Specifically, for teams and problem-solving
(PS) groups, a dummy variable is included for each category representing the percentage of
employees involved. The excluded category is workplaces with no teams (or PS groups) at
all. The sign of the coefficients for PS groups and teams varies according to the percentage
of  employees  involved.  Those  for  briefings  and  committees  are  positive,  while  the
coefficient for meetings is negative. However, among all these only the (negative) coefficient
for PS groups with 20 to 39 per cent of non-managerial employees is statistically significant
(5% level).
The  absence  of  any  significant  coefficients  might  be  attributable  to  the  simple
consideration  of  potential  FTFC  practices  whereby  no  distinction  is  made  between
workplaces that actually implement FTFC and workplaces which do not. In Regression 1.2
we attempt to distinguish between  merely formal  and  effective  FTFC practices. Alongside
with the coefficients and standard errors for each dummy variable identifying the potential
FTFC practice, we report the coefficients and standard errors for another dummy variable
identifying the effective FTFC. As explained before, for PS groups and committees potential
and effective FTFC coincide, so the same dummies used in 1.1 are re-included. Basically, the
coefficient on each of the additional dummies captures the productivity gain associated with
FTFC within the network considered.  The coefficients  for  the dummies on the potential
FTFC practices in Regression 1.2 have a different meaning from those in Regression 1.1:
here they capture the association of productivity with the same networks but in the absence
of FTFC (i.e., merely formal FTFC practice). 
We can see that the coefficients on ‘Teams (40-59%)’ and ‘Teams (40-59%) with FTFC’
are -0.200 and 0.454, respectively (both significant at the 5% level). This suggests that teams
involving this percentage of employees where FTFC is absent make a negative contribution
to workplace productivity, while FTFC strongly increases their productivity. Summing up the
two coefficients we obtain the association between labour productivity and Teams (40-59%)
adopted as an effective FTFC practice. The negative association between productivity and PS
groups with 20 to 39 per cent of non-managerial employees is still negative and significant
(5% level). Finally, the coefficients on the remaining variables are not significant.
We now assess whether the association between FTFC and productivity changes if  the
five practices are implemented on a continuous basis. PS groups are considered permanent if
they are adopted ‘permanently’ as opposed to ‘for a fixed period of time’ or ‘a mixture of
both.’ There is no direct information in WERS 2004 on the permanency of teams, meetings
and briefings. We consider briefings and meetings as permanent if they are conducted at least
once a fortnight (unfortunately, there is no such information for teams). Finally, we consider
committees as permanent if they are reported to be ‘permanent’ as opposed to ‘temporary.’
Table 4 shows the results of the regressions analysis carried out on FTFC practices which we
considered as adopted permanently based on this information. In Regression 2.1 we show the
association between potential FTFC practices and productivity. The coefficient on PS groups
involving 20 to 39% of non-managerial employees presents a negative sign while that on
briefings  is  positive  (both  coefficients  are  significant  at  the  1%  level).  All  the  other
coefficients are not significant. Regression 2.2 shows instead the results obtained when we
allow for FTFC to take place in the five networks in question. The coefficients on PS groups
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involving  20  to  39% of  non-managerial  employees,  those  including  60  to  79% of  non-
managerial employees and those including all non-managerial employees present a negative,
positive and negative sign (significant at the 1%, 10% and 10% level, respectively). There is
again  a  difference  in  sign  between  the  coefficient  on  teams  with  40  to  59%  of  core
employees  and  the  coefficient  on  the  dummy  variable  capturing  
 
Regression 2.1 Regression 2.2
Coeff. (std. err.) Coeff. (std. err.)
PS groups (1-19%) -0.003 (0.124)  -0.049 (0.140)
PS groups (20-39%) -0.331 (0.093)*** -0.329 (0.087)***
PS groups (40-59%) -0.023 (0.090) -0.028 (0.084)
PS groups (60-79%)  0.123 (0.129)  0.274 (0.150)*
PS groups (80-99%) -0.071 (0.124) -0.102 (0.12)
PS groups (100%) -0.136 (0.070) -0.136 (0.076)*
Teams (1-19%)  0.045 (0.073)  0.014 (0.068)
Teams (20-39%)  0.002 (0.052)  0.116 (0.100)
Teams (40-59%) -0.038 (0.110) -0.242 (0.077)***
Teams (60-79%) -0.024 (0.053) -0.026 (0.109)
Teams (80-99%) -0.014 (0.049)  0.003 (0.064)
Teams (100%)  0.055 (0.042)  0.007 (0.057)
Teams (1-19%) with FTFC  0.075 (0.147)
Teams (20-39%) with FTFC -0.165 (0.103)
Teams (40-59%) with FTFC  0.513 (0.192)***
Teams (60-79%) with FTFC -0.026 (0.114)
Teams (80-99%) with FTFC -0.027 (0.075)
Teams (100%) with FTFC  0.065 (0.068)
Meetings  0.042 (0.050) -0.042 (0.060)
Meetings with FTFC  0.185 (0.083)**
Briefings  0.114 (0.038)***  0.035 (0.047)
Briefings with FTFC  0.114 (0.057)**
Committees  0.067 (0.045)  0.053 (0.044)
R-squared  0.475  0.517
Number of observations 506 506
***, **, *: significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
The association between permanent FTFC practices and labour productivity
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted to account for the complex survey
design in the 2004 WERS. All the variables listed in Section 3 are controlled for.
TABLE 4
FTFC  in  the  same  teams.  The  absolute  magnitude  of  the  two  coefficients  is  larger  if
compared to Table 1. Notably, the coefficient on briefings is now not significant, while the
coefficient on ‘Briefings with FTFC’ is positive and significant (5% level). The coefficient
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on ‘Meetings  with  FTFC’ is  also  positive  and significant  (5% level).  Finally,  there  is  a
positive but not significant coefficient for committees.
We can draw some conclusion from the results presented above. First, the simple inclusion
in the empirical analysis of potential FTFC practices (the approach generally adopted by the
HRM literature) may have confounding effects: it can either lead to a failure to detect an
association between some HRM practices and labour productivity (see, for example, the case
of Teams (40-59%)) or to a claim of unconditional positive association, when productivity
gains are instead attributable to FTFC among members of the network (see, for example, the
case of permanent briefings). Second, the relative size of (i.e., the percentage of employees
involved in) FTFC-based networks seems to matters for productivity advantage. There is
either no gain (for teams) or a negative association with productivity (for PS groups) for
networks with too many or too few employees. However, the reasons behind this are still to
be  explored.  Third,  the  tendency  to  adopt  FTFC  permanently  is  crucial  to  enhance
organisational productivity. If adopted on a continuous basis, in fact, FTFC shows a positive
and significant association with value added per worker within four of the five practices in
question  (the  exception  being  committees).  Notably,  compared  to  a  situation  where  the
temporal  dimension  in  the  implementation  of  the  FTFC  practices  is  not  considered,
additional and positive productivity gains show up for problem-solving groups with 60 to 79
per cent of non-managerial employees, meetings and briefings, and the FTFC-related gain is
higher for teams with 40 to 59 per cent of core employees. The simplest explanation of this
result is that knowledge needs time to be shared, understood and processed in such a way as
to produce observable gains to the organisation. An alternative explanation, drawn on the
line of  Bogenrieder and Nooteboom (2004), is that it may take time to build up trust and
empathy between individuals, which is essential to an effective learning environment.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper uses cross-sectional data on around 500 British trading workplaces in order to
investigate  whether  a  positive  productivity  differential  exists  between  workplaces  that
implement  HRM practices  in  such  a  way  as  to  enhance  physical  proximity  and  verbal
interaction among employees (i.e., FTFC) and workplaces where such arrangements are not
in place. Our assumption is that an intense process of knowledge sharing is more likely to
arise in the former workplaces compared to the latter, and this should be reflected in higher
productivity levels observable empirically. 
We find indeed a positive association between value added per worker and FTFC in the
social networks established through four HRM practices, namely problem-solving groups,
teams,  meetings  of  line  managers  and  employees  and  meetings  of  senior  managers  and
employees. Importantly, this finding holds provided that FTFC is adopted on a continuing
basis.  The simplest explanation of this result is  that knowledge needs time to be shared,
understood and processed in such a way as to produce observable gains to the organisation.
An alternative explanation is that it might take time to build up trust and empathy between
individuals, which is essential to an effective learning environment. We also find that the
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percentage of  employees involved in FTFC-based networks is  important  to explain their
association with labour productivity: discussion within teams results in productivity gains
only if such arrangements entail 40 to 59 per cent of core employees, while for problem-
solving groups 60 to 79 per cent of non-managerial employees must be involved. However,
the reasons behind this finding are still to be explored. Our results are robust to the inclusion
of  other  HRM  practices  that  may  indirectly  provide  employees  with  the  ability  and
motivation to share their knowledge with each other.
As for  the  nature  of  the  knowledge  shared through FTFC-based  networks,  it  is  quite
difficult  to understand what type is actually disclosed within them. We recognise that in
practice  explicit  and  implicit  knowledge  may  be  used  in  combination.  For  example,
workplaces adopting problem-solving groups or teams are expected to enjoy productivity
benefits  from  both  knowledge  types  exchanged  by  employees  involved  in  such
arrangements. Also, the positive association between productivity and FTFC found for some
practices is  not very likely to reflect  gains form tacit  knowledge sharing.  In the case of
meetings of senior managers and employees, for example, explicit knowledge is more likely
to be transferred, which nonetheless has important implications for competitive advantage.
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